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VI. IN RETROSPECT:
A FIRST YEAR REVIEW OF THE CLASS
ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005
Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman*
This Article examines cases applying the Class Action Fairness
Act from its adoption in February 2005 through May 2006. The
author expects to post further updates on CAFA caselaw, which
will be accessible through the Social Science Research Network,
www.ssrn.com.
A. Statutory Applicability Questions ................................ 1136
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After more than a decade of prior efforts, the Class Action
Fairness Act' (CAFA) was finally passed in February 2005. I take
this opportunity to look at the major interpretive questions that the
new law has presented to the courts to date.
Court decisions applying CAFA in its first year have addressed
several issues, most of which have been procedural in nature. One of
the primary issues concerns arguments advanced by defendants that
CAFA applies to cases that were filed in state court before the date
that CAFA was signed into law. In addition to the issues
surrounding the statute's applicability, this study of CAFA case law
raises other significant issues of broader impact, such as: (1)
* Visiting Professor, University of Texas School of Law (2005 06);
George Butler Research Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center.
The University of Texas School of Law provided necessary funding for this
project.
1. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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reconciling textual language with arguably contradictory legislative
history; and (2) assessing whether Congress intends to alter a general
presumption in the law with specific statutory directives when the
statute is silent as to the general presumption. This Article is
organized into four Parts, with each devoted to a particular subject or
issue that courts have addressed in CAFA's first full year: (A)
statutory applicability questions; (B) the imposition of sanctions in
CAFA removal practice; (C) burden of proof issues; and (D) finally,
a discussion of several substantive issues that have arisen under the
new legislation.
A. Statutory Applicability Questions
One of the primary issues the courts have addressed in CAFA's
first year has been determining to what cases it applies. Section 9 of
CAFA provides, "[tihe amendments made by this Act shall apply to
any civil action commenced on or after the date of enactment of this
Act.",2 The problem is that Congress did not define what it meant by
"commenced."
There are a number of possibilities, of course, as to what
Congress intended by using this term. "Commenced" could refer to
the date that the action was filed in state court, or some other date
which, under state law, marks a suit's commencement.
Alternatively, Congress could have meant to refer to some other date
that application of federal law would identify. For instance,
Congress might have intended to say that a suit is "commenced"
when it is removed from state court into federal court. This reading
has some support in CAFA's policy purposes because the legislation
was passed to expand the scope of federal jurisdiction over class
action suits. 3 Still, other readings are possible.
2. Class Action Fairness Act § 9.
3. See Class Action Fairness Act § 2(b) ("The purpose[] of this Act [is to
provide] .. .for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national
importance under diversity jurisdiction . . . "). On the other hand, that
Congress sought to expand federal jurisdiction does not resolve the question of
the extent to which it has done so. See Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 404 F.3d
1232, 1237 n.6 (10th Cir. 2005) ("[The court is] mindful of the fact that
Congress' goal in passing this legislation was to increase access to federal
courts... [b]ut these general sentiments do not provide carte blanche for
federal jurisdiction over a state class action any time the statute is
ambiguous."), reprinted as amended, 420 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005).
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Although the term is undefined, and there may be some policy
reasons for reading "commenced" as based on some date other than
the date that state law marks the start of a new suit in state court,
generally speaking, when Congress has used "commenced" in the
past as a method of marking a new act's reach, it usually expected
federal courts to look to state law to determine the start date. 4 This
Part focuses on how courts have interpreted CAFA's use of the word
"commenced.", 5
Lower courts have roundly and unanimously rejected the
argument that an action is "commenced," within § 9's meaning, on
the date that it is removed to federal court. The first court to reject
the argument was the district court in Colorado, whose decision was
subsequently affirmed by Tenth Circuit in Pritchett v. Office Depot,
Inc.6 Following Pritchett, the First,7 Seventh,8 and Ninth Circuits9
have also rejected the argument that a suit is commenced for
purposes of CAFA when it is removed. No other circuit courts have
addressed the question but every reported district court decision has
4. See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 120 (1945); Cannon v. Kroger
Co., 837 F.2d 660, 664 (4th Cir. 1988) ("It is clear that a federal court must
honor state court rules governing commencement of civil actions when an
action is first brought in state court and then removed to federal court. .. ");
see also Riehl v. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 1967) ("The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to 'govern procedure after
removal.' ... Thus, Rule 3 is wholly irrelevant."); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1051 n.7 (3d ed.
2002) ("All actions within the purview of the federal rules, including suits in
equity, actions at law, diversity actions predicated upon state law, and actions
predicated upon federal law, are commenced by the filing of a complaint"); id.
§ 1052 ("In federal actions based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction,
federal courts apply state law to decide when a lawsuit was commenced for
certain purposes, such as computing limitations periods").
5. For an in depth discussion on how courts should interpret this
commencement problem, see Lonny S. Hoffman, The "Commencement"
Problem: Lessons from a Statute's First Year (2006) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=881779.
6. Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1181 (D. Colo.
2005), aff'd, 404 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2005), reprinted as amended, 420 F.3d
1090 (10th Cir. 2005).
7. Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 424 F.3d 43, 44 (1st Cir. 2005).
8. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lott, 417 F.3d 725, 726 (7th Cir. 2005); Knudsen v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 805, 806 (7th Cir. 2005).
9. Bush v. Cheaptickets, Inc., 425 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005).
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also rejected it. 10
Price v. Berkeley Premium Nutraceuticals, Inc. '' is probably
one of the strangest post-CAFA commencement cases. In Price,
plaintiffs initially filed an action in state court which the defendants
promptly removed to federal court on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 12 After the court ordered a
remand, the plaintiffs apparently had a change of heart and decided
they wanted to litigate in the federal forum. 13 To that end, they
dismissed their previous suit and re-filed a new suit in federal court,
citing CAFA as the source of the court's original jurisdiction
(plaintiffs filed the suit after CAFA had gone into effect).
14
Defendants-who also had a change of heart-now decided they
preferred a state forum and argued that the action against them was
commenced when the first state suit was filed; citing the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Pritchett, they argued that CAFA did not
therefore apply to the newly filed action.' 
5
The district court distinguished Pritchett, observing that
plaintiffs' re-filing must be treated as a new case. 16 It was also
significant to the court that it lacked jurisdiction over the initial state
action that had been removed. 17 The court did not indicate why the
absence of jurisdiction in the first case had any bearing on when the
second action was commenced for purposes of CAFA. Its relevance
probably related to the defendants' argument that it would be
"unfair" to preclude a defendant from removing a case that was
commenced before the effective date of CAFA but allow a plaintiff
10. See In re Expedia Hotel Taxes & Fees Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 904, 906
(W.D. Wash. 2005); Lander & Berkowitz, P.C. v. Transfirst Health Servs. Inc.,
374 F. Supp. 2d 776, 776-77 (E.D. Mo. 2005); Zuleski v. Hartford Acc. &
Indem. Co., No. Civ.A. 2:05-0490, 2005 WL 2739076, at *3 (S.D.W.V. Oct.
24, 2005); Korneshak v. Concentra, Inc., Nos. 05-CV-261-DRH, 05-CV-349-
DRH, 2005 WL 2488431, at *3 (S.D. 111. Oct. 7, 2005); Yescavage v. Wyeth,
Inc., No. 205CV294FTM33SPC, 2005 WL 2088429, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 30,
2005); Alsup v. 3-Day Blinds, No. Civ. 05-287-GPM, 2005 WL 2094745, at
*2-3 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2005).
11. No. 05-73169, 2005 WL 2649205 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2005).
12. Id. at *2.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at *4.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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to dismiss a pending case and re-file it so as to take advantage of the
statute's jurisdictional provision.' 8 Although the plaintiffs were
clearly forum shopping when they dismissed their state case and re-
filed a second case in federal court, they were legally entitled to do
so,19 just as the defendants were legally entitled to remove the
originally filed state case.
A second version of the commencement issue is whether a case
commences at the filing of the lawsuit or the serving of the
defendant. Defendants have argued that a state case is
"commenced," within the meaning of section 9 of CAFA, on the date
of service. A number of defendants have succeeded in this
20argument. In the only reported appellate court decision on this
issue, the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument, finding that the case
was commenced when it was filed.2'
Where a state law treats the date of service as relevant to the
date the action is commenced, it is important to consider why the
state law treats the service date as significant. If the reason the date
of service is used has to do with statute of limitations issues,22 then
such a provision ought not to have relevance to the question of when
the action is commenced for CAFA purposes. Alternatively, if the
18. Id.
19. See generally Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1677 (1990) (arguing that actions described as "forum shopping" further
legitimate goals of the legal system).
20. The following cases use the date of service as the date of
commencement: Eufaula Drugs, Inc. v. TDI Managed Care Servs., Inc., No.
2:05-CV-293-F, 2005 WL 3440635 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 14, 2005); Main Drug,
Inc. v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-292-F, 2005 WL 3440636
(M.D. Ala. Dec. 14, 2005); Dinkel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 400 F. Supp. 2d 289
(D. Me. 2005); Brown v. Kerkhoff, No. 4:05 CV 00274 JEG, 2005 WL
2671529 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 19, 2005) (suggesting that failure to serve within
three months of filing of suit could affect date suit "commenced"). But see
Lussier v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. CV 05-768-BR, 2005 WL 2211094, at
*1 2 (D. Or. Sept. 8, 2005) (holding that defendant's argument that a suit
"commenced" at service, though unsuccessful, was sufficiently reasonable so
as to preclude the plaintiff s request for attorneys' fees and costs resulting from
removal).
21. Bush v. Cheaptickets, Inc., 425 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2005).
22. An example would be a rule that treats as time-barred a suit filed just
before the statute of limitations has run when the plaintiff waits too long to
serve process. See, e.g., Multer v. Multer, 280 Ala. 458, 463 (1966) (denying
relief due to unconscionable delay under the equitable doctrine of laches,
although the action was filed within the statutory three-year period).
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state uses the date of service simply as the date on which the action
has commenced for most purposes, 23 then the date of service is the
relevant date for purposes of section 9. The courts that keep these
differences straight are more likely to attend to the purposes
Congress had in mind when it enacted CAFA. Problems arise when
the courts fail to distinguish these different kinds of date of service
24provisions.
The final commencement issue before courts concerns
amendments, which is to say situations in which a complaint was
filed prior to February 18, 2005 and amended subsequent to the
effective date of CAFA. Courts have generally looked to the
relation-back doctrine in this circumstance to determine whether the
post-statutory amendment relates back to the original filing. 25 If it
does, then the case does not fall within CAFA; alternatively, if it
does not relate back, then the action is within CAFA's reach. The
leading case on this issue is Knudsen v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co.26  Although the Knudsen court did not find the amendment
triggered a new suit for CAFA purposes, subsequent courts have
followed the Knudsen analysis and reached the opposite con-
clusion.27
23. An example of this would be the old system in New York's supreme
and county courts. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 203 note (Consol. 2006) (Practice Insights:
Filing with the County Clerk to Commence an Action). New York abandoned
the rule in favor of measuring commencement based on filing with the county
clerk to avoid encouraging defendants to avoid service. Id.
24. Compare, e.g., Lussier, 2005 WL 2211094 (rejecting defendant's
argument that the case was not commenced until it was served), with Eufaula
Drugs, 2005 WL 3440635, at *3 (holding that the state's bona fide intention
standard for effecting service "should also be applied when determining the
meaning of 'commenced' in Section 9 of CAFA").
25. See, e.g., Plummer v. Farmers Group, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1315
(E.D. Okla. 2005); supra Part I1.D.l.b (discussing the application of the
relation-back doctrine to commencement issues).
26. 411 F.3d 805 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that removal did not
.,commence" the action). After the addition of defendants and novel claims, a
second removal followed, which was upheld by the Seventh Circuit. Knudsen,
435 F.3d 755, 758 (7th Cir. 2006).
27. For example, in Adams v. Federal Materials Co., No. Civ.A. 5:05CV-
90-R, 2005 WL 1862378 (W.D. Ky. July 28, 2005), the court found, citing
Knudsen, that a defendant joined after CAFA's enactment commenced a new
suit. See id. at *4 ("Plaintiffs' decision to add Rogers Group as a defendant
presents precisely the situation in which it can and should be said that a new
action has 'commenced' for purposes of removal pursuant to the CAFA.").
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Since Knudsen, the courts have been inconsistent in their use of
relation back law.28 A few courts that have found that reliance on the
relation-back doctrine is misplaced; however several have lost
precedential value due to subsequent higher court decisions.29
After Pritchett, courts have readily rejected the argument that
would have given the broadest effect to when a suit is "commenced"
under CAFA (that is, a case is "commenced" when it is removed).
Similarly, after Knudsen, courts have also rejected the slight
variation on the argument that a suit is "commenced" when the
plaintiffs broaden the class definition, though, as we have seen,
Knudsen's legacy in referencing relation-back law has been
significant. Not all courts have found post-CAFA amendments to
constitute the commencement of a new suit for CAFA purposes, but
nearly all have followed Knudsen in turning to relation-back law to
analyze the problem.
28. The following cases applied the relation-back doctrine to hold that an
amended complaint did not commence a new action for the purposes of CAFA:
Phillips v. Ford Motor Co., 435 F.3d 785, 787-88 (7th Cir. 2006); Plubell v.
Merck & Co., Inc., 434 F.3d 1070, 1071-74 (8th Cir. 2006) (relying on
Missouri relation-back law); Brown v. Kerkhoff, No. 4:05 CV 00274 JEG,
2005 WL 2671529, at *12 16 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 19, 2005); Eufaula Drugs, Inc.
v. Scipsolutions, No. 2:05CV370-A, 2005 WL 2465746, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Oct.
6, 2005); Siew Hian Lee v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 4:05CV1216JCH, 2005
WL 2456955, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 5, 2005); Judy v. Pfizer, Inc., No.
4:05CV1208RWS, 2005 WL 2240088, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 14, 2005); New
Century Health Quality Alliance, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan.
City, No. 05-0555-CVWSOW, 2005 WL 2219827, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 13,
2005); Morgan v. Am. Int'l. Group, Inc., No. C-05-2798 MMC, 2005 WL
2172001, at *2 3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2005) (relying on California relation-back
law).
By contrast, the following cases applied the relation-back doctrine to
hold that an amended complaint did commence a new action for the purposes
of CAFA: Plummer, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 1316 17; Senterfitt v. SunTrust
Mortgage, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1379 80 (S.D. Ga. 2005). See generally
Hoffman, supra note 5 (arguing that the turn to relation-back law is, in most
cases, unnecessary and mistaken).
29. See, e.g., Comes v. Microsoft, 403 F. Supp. 2d 897, 903-04 (S.D. Iowa
2005); Weekley v. Guidant Corp., 392 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1068 (E.D. Ark.
2005) ("Those claims may or may not 'relate back' to the original complaint
for limitations purposes. Nevertheless, a civil action ... commenced when the
initial complaint was filed."); Smith v. Collingsworth, No. 4:05CV01382-
WRW, 2005 WL 3533133, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 21, 2005) ("[I]n view of the
simple directive in § 9 of CAFA, whether an amended complaint relates back
is irrelevant.").
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Still other creative attempts have been ventured to come within
CAFA's terms. One argument advanced has been that where the suit
was filed just before February 18, 2005, CAFA's enactment date, but
the defendant promptly removed the action within thirty days, but
after February 18, then the case was commenced within the meaning
of CAFA. Pfizer actually made this argument in two cases: Pfizer,
Inc. v. Lott, and Natale v. Pfizer, Inc.3 In both cases, the trial court
rejected the defendants' argument and, after virtually simultaneous
appeal, the respective appellate courts did the same.
3 2
The timing of these cases may have caused particular frustration
for the defendant, Pfizer. Both cases were filed shortly before CAFA
was passed. In particular, Pfizer, Inc. v. Lott was filed on February
17, only one day before CAFA went into effect. 33 Pfizer knew, of
course, that the jurisdictional arguments in Pritchet
3 4 and Knudsen35
had failed, and they needed to develop a different argument for
sustaining federal jurisdiction under CAFA. To that end, Pfizer
argued that removal first became possible when CAFA was passed
and that jurisdiction was proper because the removal was taken
within thirty days of filing of the state suit-quite unlike Pritchett
and Knudsen. Both the Seventh and First Circuits rejected the
attempt to extend CAFA to cover a state case filed before CAFA's
effective date, albeit just in advance of CAFA's passage.
36
Writing in Lott, Judge Posner noted that Congress could have
written into the federal statute a specific standard for determining
when a state suit "commenced., 37 CAFA could have provided that
an action may be removed if it is commenced after CAFA's effective
date but that a state action commenced before the effective date was
also removable under CAFA if it is removed within a certain time
30. 417 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2005).
31. 424 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2005).
32. Natale v. Pfizer, 379 F. Supp. 2d 161, 163 (D. Mass 2005), aff'd, 424
F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2005); Lott v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 05-CV-0230-MJR, 2005 WL
3618027 (S.D. Ill. May 26, 2005), aff'd, 417 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2005).
33. Lott, 417 F.3d at 726 ("The rub is that the suit was filed in the state
court the day before the Act was enacted .... ").
34. Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005).
35. Knudsen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 805 (7th Cir. 2005).
36. Lott, 417 F.3d at 726 ("But as Pfizer points out, there is a difference
between the present case on the one hand and Knudsen and Pritchett on the
other."); Natale, 424 F.3d at 44.
37. Lott, 417 F.3d at 727.
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period.38 The problem, as Posner pointed out in Lott, is that this is
exactly what Congress did not do.
39
Posner could have also rejected Pfizer's argument on another
ground. Pfizer's attempt to bring the state suit-filed prior to the
effective date of the act-within CAFA's reach by citing its
compliance with the thirty day removal window of § 1446(b)
40
misconstrues the statutory language's purpose and effect.4' To
understand § 1446(b), it is necessary to distinguish two
circumstances. Assume a case involves parties not of diverse
citizenship and plaintiffs' claims are based exclusively on state law.
If at some later point in time the plaintiffs amend their complaint to
add a claim for relief arising under federal law, that claim may be
removed by itself under the authority of § 1441(c), 42 or the entire
case may be removed under the authority of § 1441 (a),43 through the
particular grant of original jurisdiction in § 133 144 and by virtue of
the separate grant of supplemental jurisdiction over all claims within
§ 1367(a).45 In this circumstance, § 1446(b) merely provides that the
right to remove must be exercised within 30 days after the defendant
is notified of the amended suit with the federal claim added to it.
4 6
Contrast this to the argument made in Lott and Natale for
allowing removal of a suit previously pending before the date the
statute went into effect.47 The problem with the argument is that
§ 1446(b) is not a grant of original jurisdiction to the district courts.
48
Where it applies, it is merely one constraint on the statutory right of
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006).
41. See, e.g., Rashid v. Schenck Constr. Co. Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1081, 1088
(S.D.W. Va. 1993) (stating that "the one-year limitation for the removal of
cases on the basis of diversity operates to divest the court of jurisdiction");
Perez v. Gen. Packer, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 1464, 1470 (C.D. Cal. 1992),
overruled by Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1998);
Foiles v. Merrell Nat'l Labs., 730 F. Supp. 108, 110 (N.D. 111. 1989); Smith v.
MBL Life Assurance Corp., 727 F. Supp. 601, 604 (N.D. Ala. 1989).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2006).
43. Id. § 1441(a).
44. § 1331.
45. § 1367(a).
46. § 1446(b).
47. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lott, 417 F.3d 725, 726 (7th Cir. 2005); Natale v. Pfizer,
Inc., 424 F.3d 43, 43 (1 st Cir. 2005).
48. § 1446(b).
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removal. Section 1446(b) cannot transform a case otherwise outside
of the original jurisdiction of the district courts into one inside of it.
49
B. Imposition of Sanctions for Improvident Removals
In Schorsch v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 5 the Seventh Circuit had
opportunity to revisit its dicta in Knudsen regarding whether a
subsequent amendment that attempts to assert a new claim might
cause a case filed prior to CAFA to be deemed commenced at the
time of the amendment, thus triggering CAFA's application.51 In
Schorsch, the named plaintiff brought suit in Illinois in 2003
proposing to represent a class of persons who purchased printer
components from Hewlett-Packard. 52 Plaintiff alleged that Hewlett-
Packard manufactured the part in such a way that it prevented
purchasers from using the product's entire useful life.53 After
CAFA's effectuation, Plaintiff amended the suit to add a new claim
that would expand the class to include those who had purchased parts
other than the one component at issue. 54 On this basis, Hewlett-
Packard removed the entire case, claiming that the amendment
commenced a new suit against it for purposes of CAFA.55 The
Seventh Circuit again was unpersuaded:
From its outset, this suit has been about HP's use of
EEPROM chips to shut down its printers until a component
has been replaced. Identity of the consumable is a
detail.... This is still just one suit, between the original
litigants. Litigants and judges regularly modify class
definitions; Knudsen holds that such changes do not
49. Accord Yescavage v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 205CV294FTM33SPC, 2005
WL 2088429, at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2005) ("The procedure for removal,
including the time limitations set forth above, applies only when removal is
proper. In this case, where no federal question has been pled, where
Defendants have not alleged that diversity of citizenship exists in the absence
of CAFA's relaxed standards for diversity, and where CAFA does not apply
because the case was 'commenced' prior to CAFA's enactment, removal was
improper regardless of when the notice of removal was filed.").
50. 417 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2005).
51. Knudsen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 805, 807 (7th Cir. 2005).
52. Id. at 749.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 749-50
55. Id. at 750.
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"Icommence" new suits.56
Judge Easterbrook thus concluded, "[w]e can imagine amendments
that kick off wholly distinct claims, but the workaday changes
routine in class suits do not."
57
It got worse-much worse-for Hewlett-Packard. Not only did
the court reject Hewlett-Packard's attempt to treat the amendment as
a new action for CAFA purposes, but it also signaled to the plaintiff
and the district court that an award of attorneys fees for improper
removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) may be warranted. 58 No doubt
the panel was motivated, following its decisions in Knudsen and Lott,
to send the message that defense lawyers had better think twice
before removing another case under CAFA filed prior to February
18, 2005.59
Other courts, more willing to treat attempts to come within
CAFA as based in good faith, have rejected arguments that sanctions
should be imposed under § 1447(c).6 °  In Schorsch, Judge
Easterbrook also readdressed the choice-of-law issue. 61 As discussed
previously, Knudsen mentioned the possible relevance of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) to a case where a plaintiff did attempt
to bring another claim or name a new party.62 Thus, Knudsen left the
impression that resort to the federal relation-back rule was proper to
determine when a state action that has been amended is
"commenced" for purposes of CAFA, even though the statute is
56. Id.
57. Id. at 751.
58. See id. ("Defendants should recognize that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) makes
an award of attorneys' fees the norm for improper removal.").
59. See id. ("[W]e reiterate[] that creative lawyering will not be allowed to
smudge the line drawn by the 2005 Act: class actions 'commenced' in state
court on or before February 18, 2005, remain in state court.").
60. See, e.g., Lussier v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. CV 05-768-BR, 2006
WL 44191 (D. Or. Jan. 6, 2006) (remanding suit, but concluding that since the
commencement question was matter of first impression in the circuit at the
time the defendant removed the suit, attorneys' fees and costs should not be
awarded); Phillips v. Ford Motor Co., No. 05-CV-503-DRH, 2005 WL
3263905 (S.D. 111. Nov. 30, 2005) (rejecting request for attorneys fees and
further chastising class counsel for the excessiveness of the sanctions sought),
aff'd, 435 F.3d 785 (7th Cir. 2006).
61. Schorsch v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 417 F.3d 748, 750-51 (7th Cir.
2005).
62. Knudsen, 411 F.3d at 807.
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silent on the question.
63
In Schorsch, Judge Easterbrook observed, without explanation,
that although Knudsen had referenced Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(c) as bearing relevance on the date of commencement
question, "state rather than federal practice must supply the rule of
decision" for determining when an action is commenced for purposes
of deciding whether CAFA applies to the state action after
amendment. 64 He continued to insist, though, that relation-back rules
bore relevance for deciding the scope of CAFA's applicability under
section 9.65
Apparently undaunted by the Schorsch court's recommendation
to the district court to consider sanctioning Hewlett-Packard for its
improper removal in Schorsch, the defendants in Schillinger v. Union
Pacific Railroad Co. 66 argued that CAFA applied to a state case filed
67prior to February 18, 2005. In Schillinger, the Seventh Circuit
again rejected the attempt to expand the statute's reach.68
The Schillingers sued Union Pacific Railroad Corporation
(UPC) and Union Pacific Railroad Company (UPRR) alleging that
the two companies illegally leased plaintiffs land to a third party.
69
An initial attempt at removing the case on traditional diversity
grounds was unsuccessful because the amount in controversy was
found insufficient.70  After remand, the plaintiffs dismissed UPC
after they realized that this entity did not own any right of way.V7
They thereafter sought to amend their complaint, seeking
certification of a nationwide class.72 The amended complaint also
inadvertently included UPC as a defendant in the case's caption and
in a number of the allegations, even though they had dismissed UPC
and had made no attempt at service on UPC.
73
63. Id.
64. Schorsch, 417 F.3d at 750.
65. See id.
66. 425 F.3d 330 (7th Cir. 2005).
67. Id. at331,333 34.
68. Id. at 332, 335.
69. Id. at 332. The issue appeared to turn on whether the companies leased
the right-of-way, which they possessed, or encroached on land owned by the
plaintiffs. See id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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Although the state case predated CAFA, the defendants argued
that the two post-statute developments-the request for certification
of a nationwide class and the (albeit mistaken) re-joinder of UPC
"changed the case so profoundly" that it now was removable.74 The
district court again ordered remand, and defendants sought leave to
appeal to the Seventh Circuit.75 For the fourth time in as many tries,
a defendant's attempt to get the Seventh Circuit to find CAFA
applicable to a state case filed before the CAFA's enactment was
unsuccessful.76 The court quickly dispatched the defendants' first
argument. Because UPC was rejoined in the case and, thus, a new
action was commenced against it after February 18, 2005, the district
court found that "UPC was never really brought back into the case,"
concluding that it was merely "a scrivener's error" on plaintiffs' part
that could be corrected by subsequent amendment.
77
The defendants' second basis for removal was that when the
plaintiffs went from seeking only a statewide class to certification of
a nationwide class, that amendment was a "step sufficiently distinct
that courts would treat it as independent for limitations purposes,"
borrowing language from Knudsen.78  Writing for the panel in
Schorsch, Judge Wood recognized that the expanded class would
have been far more onerous to defend against, but, following
Knudsen and Schorsch, concluded that "the potential for a larger
amount of legal research and discovery in and of itself is not a
significant enough step to create new litigation. ,79 Judge Wood then
discussed a second possible reason for rejecting defendants'
argument, though she did not base the decision on this ground.80 She
noted that for purposes of deciding whether an amended complaint
meets the statute of limitations deadline, Illinois courts consider the
date the motion to amend is filed, and not the date that the motion is
74. Id.
75. Id. at 331 32.
76. Id. at 335.
77. Id. at 333.
78. Id. at 334 (quoting Knudsen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 805, 807
(7th Cir. 2005)).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 334 35 ("It is not clear whether [the state] practice [of using the
filing date of a motion to amend to determine if the statute-of-limitations
deadline has been met] would govern federal procedure in the circumstances
presented here.").
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granted. 81 If the Illinois rule were the governing rule, then it would
have been dispositive in Schillinger because the motion to expand
the proposed class was filed before CAFA's enactment but had not
yet been ruled upon when the new statute went into effect.8 2 Having
already concluded that the nature of the amendment sought was not
significant enough to treat the amended suit as the commencement of
a new lawsuit for CAFA purposes, the court decided not to reach
whether state law governed, or whether the outcome would be
different under the federal rules of procedure.
83
C. Appellate Piggybacking
and the Shifting Sands of Burden of Proof
The last major circuit court decision handed down as of this
writing to construe CAFA was Brill v. Countrywide, 4 a case in
which the defendant removed a state suit both on the basis of CAFA
and on the basis of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(TCPA).85  The district court remanded the case, finding that the
amount in controversy was inadequate under CAFA and that TCPA
conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the state court.
86
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis in Brill by addressing the
question of who bears the burden of proving the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction. 87 Defendant conceded the long standing general
rule that the party seeking to maintain federal jurisdiction bears the
burden of proof, but argued that the burden of demonstrating lack of
federal jurisdiction is on the plaintiff in a CAFA case.88
At the time the defendant in Brill advanced this argument, the
lower courts were split on whether CAFA shifts the burden of proof
to the party seeking remand. Some had held-and several more have
81. Id.
82. Id. at 335.
83. Id.
84. 427 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2005).
85. Id. at 447; Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (codified as amended principally at 47 U.S.C. § 227
(2006)). See generally Robert R. Biggerstaff, State Courts and the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Must States Opt-In? Can States Opt-Out?,
33 CONN. L. REv. 407 (2001) (discussing jurisdictional issues under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act).
86. Brill, 427 F.3d at 447.
87. Id. at 447-48.
88. Id. at 448.
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since held-that CAFA shifts the burden of proving the nonexistence
of subject matter jurisdiction to the plaintiffs.8 9 Others have refused
to find CAFA alters the traditional burden of demonstrating subject
matter jurisdiction.
90
The argument that CAFA does shift the burden of proof cannot
be made on the basis of the text alone: it is a rather inconvenient fact
for burden-shifters that CAFA is silent about who bears the burden
of proving or disproving the existence of jurisdiction under CAFA.
The argument for the shift in the traditional burden of proof is
instead usually made on the basis of a portion of CAFA's legislative
history, namely part of one Senate Judiciary Committee report that
provides: "If a purported class action is removed pursuant to these
jurisdictional provisions, the named plaintiff(s) should bear the
burden of demonstrating that the removal was improvident (i.e., that
the applicable jurisdictional requirements are not satisfied)."91 This
was, of course, exactly the language the defendant in Brill
referenced.92
Reliance on the statute's legislative history certainly seems
misplaced. To begin with, it is not at all clear that reference to the
89. Harvey v. Blockbuster, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 749, 752 (D.N.J. 2005);
Berry v. Am. Express Publ'g, Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1122 23 (C.D.
Cal. 2005); Natale v. Pfizer, 379 F. Supp. 2d 161, 168 (D. Mass. 2005)
(observing that "the burden of removal is on the party opposing removal to
prove that remand is appropriate"); Lussier v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. CV
05-768-BR, 2005 WL 2211094, at *1 (D. Or. Sept. 8, 2005) (CAFA shifts
burden of proof on jurisdiction to plaintiff); In re Textainer P'ship Sec. Litig.,
No. C 05-0969 MMC, 2005 WL 1791559, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2005);
Waitt v. Merck & Co., Inc., No. C05-0759L, 2005 WL 1799740, at *2 (W.D.
Wash. July 27, 2005); Yeroushalmi v. Blockbuster, Inc., No. CV 05-225-
AHM(RCX), 2005 WI 2083008, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2005).
90. See Fiore v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., No. 05-CV-474-DRH, 2005 WL
3434074 (S.D. 111. Dec. 13, 2005); Fisher v. Beverly Enters., Inc., No.
5:05CV00316SWW, 2005 WL 3409589 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 12, 2005); Plummer
v. Farmers Group, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1317 18 (E.D. Okla. 2005);
Judy v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 4:05CV1208RWS, 2005 WL 2240088, at *2 (E.D.
Mo. Sept. 14, 2005); Schwartz v. Comcast, Corp., No. Civ.A. 05-2340, 2005
WL 1799414, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2005); In re Expedia Hotel Taxes &
Fees Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 904, 905 (W.D. Wash. 2005); Sneddon v. Hotwire,
Inc., Nos. C 05-0951 SI, C 05-0952 SI, C 05-0953 SI, 2005 WL 1593593, at
* 1 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2005).
91. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 42 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
40.
92. Brill, 427 F.3d at 448.
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legislative history is warranted in the first instance. As one district
court sagely observed: "[tihe omission of a burden of proof standard
in the CAFA does not create an ambiguity inviting courts to scour its
legislative history to decide the point."93 Moreover, although none
of the courts have made reference to it, the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services94 and its
treatment of the value of legislative history in the context of the
supplemental jurisdiction statute, certainly should give pause to
purveyors of the CAFA burden-shifting argument.
95
The better argument would seem to be that,
[b]y failing to specifically address the burden of proof in
the Act, especially in light of discussing the issue in a
Committee Report, Congress is deemed to have not
intended to change the settled case law on that issue. Had
Congress wished to change which party bears the burden of
proof in a removal action under the CAFA it could have
explicitly done so.
96
In Brill, the Seventh Circuit was unimpressed with the defendant's
citation to CAFA's legislative history.97 It reaffirmed that the burden
of demonstrating the existence of federal subject matter jurisdiction
in a CAFA removal rests with the party seeking the federal forum.
98
Nothing in CAFA expressly alters the traditional placement of the
burden, Easterbrook noted, and the views of some congressmen (that
are nowhere reflected in the engrossed bill), are not controlling.
99
93. Ongstad v. Piper Jaffray & Co., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1089 (D.N.D.
2006).
94. 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005).
95. Id. at 2625-26. In Exxon, the Supreme Court found that resort to
legislative history was inappropriate when the statute itself is unambiguous.
Id. at 2626. Like the supplemental jurisdiction statute at issue in Exxon, CAFA
is unambiguous: There is no provision on burden of proof, and, under Exxon, a
Senate Report cannot imply such a provision into the act. Congress is
presumed to be aware of existing law when it passes legislation. See, e.g.,
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 700-01 (1992). As such, the pre-
existing rule, of which Congress was aware, should remain in effect until
Congress explicitly changes it. See id. at 701.
96. Ongstad, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 1089.
97. Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir.
2005).
98. Id.
99. Id.
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The last interesting procedural issue that arose in Brill
concerned the right to an interlocutory appeal. 100 As we have seen,
CAFA contains a provision, § 1453(c), that allows a party to seek
leave to appeal a remand order, a privilege usually unavailable as a
consequence of the remand review bar in § 1447(d). 10 On the basis
of § 1453(c), the defendant successfully petitioned for appellate
review of the district court's remand order.1 0 2 What was different
about Brill was that the defendant argued that a separate federal
statute provided another basis for original federal question
jurisdiction, beyond CAFA.10 3 The Seventh Circuit found that it
could review the remand order as to the separate federal statute, even
though § 1447(d) would otherwise preclude appellate review of the
remand order had the case been removed solely under the other
federal statute and not also under CAFA. 10 4 "Because § 1453(c)(1)
permits appellate review of remand orders 'notwithstanding section
1447(d),"' the court in Brill concluded, "we are free to consider any
potential error in the district court's decision, not just a mistake in
application of the Class Action Fairness Act."'
10 5
D. Substantive Interpretations of CAFA
As we have seen, most of the cases addressing CAFA in its first
year have dealt with procedural issues, primarily, to what cases does
CAFA apply? A few courts have begun to address some substantive
questions under CAFA, however, and they merit brief discussion.
The substantive issue in Brill turned on whether the amount in
controversy in the case exceeded $5 million because, under CAFA,
the district court would have then had jurisdiction. 1 6 The defendant
easily met its burden, the Seventh Circuit found, because the
defendant conceded that it had done enough of the things about
100. Id. at451 52.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (2006) ("[N]otwithstanding section 1447(d), a
court of appeals may accept an appeal from an order of a district court granting
or denying a motion to remand a class action to the State court from which it
was removed if application is made to the court of appeals not less than 7 days
after entry of the order.").
102. Brill, 427 F.3d at 447, 451 52.
103. See id. at 451.
104. Id. at 451-52.
105. Id. at451.
106. Id. at 447-49.
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which plaintiff complained (distributing fax advertisements); thus, it
was simply a math equation at this point to determine whether the
minimum amount in controversy had been reached. 10 7  Plaintiffs
might have avoided federal court if they had alleged they would not
seek more than $5 million, but they had not done so.' 
08
One district court has also addressed the issue of quantifying the
amount in controversy for CAFA purposes. In Eufaula, after finding
that the case was commenced after CAFA was enacted, the court was
still apparently unsure of who bore the burden of proving the
existence of jurisdiction and ordered the parties to file further
briefing addressing the issue °109 The court failed to cite either Brill
or any of the cases discussed above that have also addressed the
question. Then, without waiting to decide who must carry the
burden, the court required both sides to provide "specific evidence"
to support their assertion that the amount in controversy was or was
not met.' 10
It is not entirely clear what specific evidence the court required
at this stage of the case to evaluate whether the amount in the
controversy exceeded CAFA's jurisdictional minimum of $5 million.
Plaintiffs in Eufaula sought certification of a nationwide class that it
hoped to define as "all pharmacies and/or other similar entities who
entered into a contract which provided for reimbursement of
prescriptions" with defendant over the last six years, according to a
formula that used the average wholesale price of the drug.
111
Seeking to avoid removal to federal court on the basis of § 1332, the
plaintiffs also specifically limited their recovery to no more than
$74,500 per plaintiff."12
A plaintiffs willingness to limit the amount of damages sought
is typically recognized. 13 But because each of the class members
107. Id. at 447.
108. Id. at 449.
109. Eufaula Drugs, Inc. v. TDI Managed Care Servs., Inc., No. 2:05-CV-
293-F, 2005 WL 3440635, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 14, 2005).
110. Id.
Il1l. Id. at "2.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283,
294 (1938); Seroyer v. Pfizer, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 1308, 1311 (M.D. Ala. 1997);
supra Part III.C.2 (discussing the calculation of amount in controversy under
CAFA).
1152
FIRST YEAR REVIEW OF CAFA
claims are aggregated post-CAFA, it is also now necessary to make a
showing as to how many putative members of the class there would
likely be. 114 Still, the basic obligation is likely to remain the same:
the party who seeks to establish federal jurisdiction must show by "a
reasonable probability that the stakes exceed the minimum,"
'11 5
provided that the allegations are made in good faith.
1 16
Another interesting substantive issue under CAFA that courts
have addressed is the question of what kind of case constitutes a
"class action" within CAFA's reach. Given that many-perhaps
most-cases that qualify as "class actions" will come within CAFA,
it is not surprising that there would be some debate over what kinds
of cases meet this qualification. The court in Fisher v. Beverly
Enterprises, Inc.117 dealt with this problem. In Fisher, a nursing
home resident brought suit against the nursing home for negligent
care and other claims under state law." 8  Plaintiff did not seek
certification under the state's class action rule, filing only a direct
suit on her own behalf.' 19
When she subsequently sought an injunction against the
defendant to prevent it from merging with another company, as well
as imposition of a constructive trust, the defendant argued that the
relief sought by plaintiff in the suit, which was identical to relief
sought in six similar patient care cases, would impact all similarly
situated plaintiffs and, thus, should be treated as though it were a
class action. 120  The district court rejected the attempt to turn the
plaintiffs single claims into representative litigation under Rule 23
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6) (2006) ("[T]he claims of the individual class
members shall be aggregated to determine whether the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000."); see, e.g., Ongstad v. Piper Jaffray
& Co., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1091-92 (D.N.D. 2006).
115. Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir.
2005) (citing Smith v. Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 888, 892
(7th Cir. 2003)); Chase v. Shop 'N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 110 F.3d 424,
427 (7th Cir. 1997)).
116. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 303 U.S. at 288-89 ("[T]he sum claimed
by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith. It must
appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional
amount to justify dismissal." (citations omitted)).
117. No. 5:05CV00316SWW, 2005 WL 3409589 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 12, 2005).
118. Id. at* 1.
119. See id.
120. Id.
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or a state equivalent. 121 Citing the new § 1332(d), the court ruled that
CAFA did not apply to plaintiffs claims because it covered only
"any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure
authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representative
persons as a class action."
' 122
Adams v. Federal Materials Co.123 is also worth briefly
mentioning. In Adams, the plaintiffs tried to argue that 28 U.S.C. §
1332(d)(4)(B)'s mandatory remand provision applied. 124 This CAFA
subsection requires the court to decline jurisdiction where "two-
thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the
aggregate, and the primary defendants, are citizens of the State in
which the action was originally filed."'125 The plaintiffs' argument
was that one defendant, who had been originally joined as a third-
party defendant, should not have its citizenship counted for purposes
of applying this subsection. 126 The court refused to go along with
this argument, however, where the plaintiffs subsequently amended
the complaint to assert claims directly against this defendant.
127
E. Conclusion
Beyond these few cases addressing substantive issues under
CAFA, most CAFA case law handed down in the statute's first year
has addressed only procedural issues relevant under the act: what is
the relevance and import of CAFA's legislative history, particularly
when the statutory text is otherwise silent or neutral; whether CAFA
can ever be applied to cases pending before CAFA's effective date;
and whether CAFA shifts the burden of proof on demonstrating the
existence of federal jurisdiction. Further discussion of CAFA's sub-
stantive content awaits.
In closing, it is perhaps worthwhile to suggest one other virtue to
having undertaken this retrospective review. Studying the decisions
that have come down after CAFA's enactment offers an opportunity
121. See id. at *2.
122. Id. at *2 n.2 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006)).
123. No. Civ.A. 5:05CV-90-R, 2005 WL 1862378 (W.D. Ky. July 28, 2005).
124. Id. at *2, *5.
125. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B) (2006).
126. Adams, 2005 WL 1862378, at *5.
127. Id; see also supra Part III.B.2.a.i (discussing various potential
definitions for CAFA's phrase, "primary defendants").
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to vividly witness the kind of strategic decision-making and
gamesmanship that routinely takes place after a change in the law by
those most centrally involved in dealing with it; that is, lawyers
representing clients in cases to which the law may or may not be
applicable. Observing and exposing these strategic maneuverings in
the immediate aftermath of a new law's enactment-particularly one
as significant as CAFA's-offers an important reminder that forum
shopping in civil litigation is, and probably always will be, a two-
way street.
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